This paper tests whether OECD countries compete with each other over corporate taxes in order to attract investment. We develop two models: with …rm mobility, countries compete only over the statutory tax rate or the e¤ective average tax rate, while with capital mobility, countries compete only over the e¤ective marginal tax rate. We estimate the parameters of reaction functions using data from 21 countries between 1983 and 1999. We …nd evidence that countries compete over all three measures, but particularly over the statutory tax rate and the e¤ective average tax rate. This is consistent with a belief amongst governments that location choices by multinational …rms are discrete. We also …nd evidence of concave reaction functions, consistent with the model outlined in the paper.
Introduction
Statutory rates of corporation tax in developed countries have fallen substantially over the last two decades. The average rate amongst OECD countries in the early 1980s was nearly 50%; by 2001 this had fallen to under 35%. In 1992, the European Union's Ruding Committee recommended a minimum rate of 30% -then lower than any rate in Europe (with the exception of a special rate for manufacturing in Ireland). Ten years later, already one third of the members of the European Union have a rate at or below this level. It is commonly believed that the reason for these declining rates is a process of tax competition: countries compete with each other to attract inward ‡ows of capital by reducing their tax rates on corporate pro…t. Such a belief has led to increasing attempts at international coordination in order to maintain revenue from corporation taxes. Both the European Union and the OECD introduced initiatives in the late 1990s designed to combat what they see as "harmful" tax competition.
The notion that there is increasing competitive pressure on governments to reduce their corporation tax rates has been the subject of a growing theoretical literature -surveyed by Wilson (1999) . But there have been no detailed attempts to examine whether there is any empirical evidence of such international competition in taxes on corporate income. In this paper we aim to provide such evidence.
Before turning to evidence, however, it is necessary to expand existing theory, which su¤ers from three important and related weaknesses. First, the vast majority of existing theory does not adequately deal with the fact that governments have two broad instruments for determining corporate income taxes: the rate and the base. Almost exclusively, 1 theoretical models of tax competition combine these into a single e¤ ective marginal tax rate (EMTR), which is the tax on the marginal return to capital. For example, in the standard model in the literature, developed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986 and Wilson, 1986 , referred to below as the ZMW model, governments levy taxes on the returns to capital only. But it is easily shown that when the statutory rate and the base of the corporate tax can be set independently, the return to capital and the pure economic rent accruing to the owners of the …rm can be also taxed independently.
So, a prerequisite for an adequate theory of corporate tax competition is to allow countries to compete in two dimensions, over the rate and the base: this requires an extension of the existing theory 2 .
As second problem that follows immediately is that if the rent accruing to the owner of the …rm can be taxed, then as long as the owners are immobile, the corporate tax can be made nondistortionary by allowing full deductibility of capital expenditure -a cash- ‡ow corporate tax.
But, in many standard models of tax competition, notably the ZMW model, the owners of the …rms are assumed immobile 3 . This then raises a problem for the modelling of tax competition: governments will not react to each others'taxes, but simply use the cash- ‡ow corporate tax to …nance their expenditures. So an extension of the theory to the case of mobile …rms is required.
A third and related point is that in practice, multinational …rms make discrete choices as to where to locate. 4 Discrete location choices do not depend on the EMTR. Rather they depend on how taxes a¤ect the post-tax level of pro…t available in each potential location. In a world of mobile …rms, location is determined by the proportion of pro…t taken in tax, measured by the e¤ ective average tax rate (EATR). In turn, the underlying parameters of the corporate tax system, the rate and the base, determine both the EMTR and the EATR.
We therefore begin by developing two models which help clarify the nature of corporate tax competition. In the …rst model, …rms are mobile, but countries are small relative to the world capital market. In this case, it is shown that countries compete only in the EATR. 5 In our second model 6 , …rms are immobile, and countries are large relative to the world capital market.
In this case, it is shown that countries compete only in the EMTR. For each of the two models, we derive tax reaction functions, and we pay particular attention to the shape of these reaction functions. Under plausible assumptions, they are concave in the neighborhood of symmetric equilibrium : that is, countries react more strongly to the tax cuts of others when their own taxes are high.
Having developed these two models, we confront them with data, speci…cally a panel data set of 21 OECD countries between 1983 and 1999. Motivated by our theory, we see the key question as being whether there is evidence of interaction between countries in their setting of the EATR or the EMTR, or indeed, both. A secondary question is whether there is evidence of non-linearity, or more speci…cally, concavity in these reaction functions. Our empirical measures of the EATR and the EMTR are derived from applying the rules of the tax system to a hypothetical investment project . These measures have been used for other purposes 7 , but not for investigating strategic interactions between countries: this paper is the …rst, to our knowledge, to estimate tax reaction functions based on detailed measures of corporate taxes. 8 .
These measures are time-consuming to construct in that they involve collection of data about parameters of the corporate tax system in each country and each year, as well as considerable calculation. This may be one reason for the lack of progress on this important question to date.
Our …ndings are as follows. We …nd evidence consistent with our prediction (under the assumption of mobile …rms) that countries compete over the statutory tax rate and the EATR.
We …nd rather weaker evidence that countries compete over EMTRs. Our …ndings are thus consistent with the common belief amongst governments that the typical location decision of a multinational is a mutually exclusive discrete choice between two locations. So, contrary to the vast majority of the theoretical literature, we would argue that the impact of interactions in corporate tax can be measured by the EATR rather than by the EMTR. We also …nd evidence in favour of the concavity of the reaction functions predicted by the theory. Speci…cally, we …nd countries with relatively high tax rates tend to respond more strongly to changes in tax rates in other countries.
Our empirical work builds on a small but growing empirical literature on strategic interaction between …scal authorities, initiated by a pioneering study by Case, Rosen and Hines (1993) , who estimated an empirical model of strategic interaction in expenditures among state governments in the US. Apart from the careful examination of the form of tax rate, our approach extends this literature in two ways. First, existing empirical work on tax reaction functions has employed data on local (business) property tax rates (Brueckner, 1998 , Brett and Pinkse, 2000 , Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998 , or on local or state income taxes Case, 1995, Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998) . This is signi…cant, because, while local property taxes may determine 7 For example, constructed measures of the EMTR have been used elsewhere to make international comparisons of corporate income taxes (see, for example, King and Fullerton (1984) , OECD (1991), Devereux and Pearson (1995) , Chennells and Gri¢ th (1997), European Commission (2001) ). Devereux and Freeman (1995) provide evidence that ‡ows of foreign direct investment depend on di¤erences in the EMTR across countries. Devereux and Gri¢ th (1998) provide evidence that the discrete location choices of US multinationals depend on di¤erences in the EATR.
8 Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) and include corporate taxes in more general empirical studies of tax competition. However, their measures are based on tax revenue data, which do not provide a good measure of incentives, either for marginal or discrete investment decisions. business location within a region, corporate taxes are the most obvious taxes in determining location of investment between countries. Our study is therefore the …rst to test whether there is national-level competition through taxes to attract investment. Second, our empirical approach to estimating tax reaction functions also di¤ers somewhat from the Case-Rosen-Hines methodology followed closely by many other papers. First, based on the models we develop, as noted above we allow reaction functions to be non-linear. Second, we allow tax reaction functions to be dynamic. This has two aspects. First, we suppose that there is some cost to changing tax rates, which generates less than instant adjustment to the new equilibrium level -this implies a role for the lagged dependent variable. Second, we also allow for the possibility that governments respond to lagged values of other countries'tax rates, instead of only the contemporaneous rates.
Of course, it is possible that strategic interaction in tax setting may also be due to electoral or yardstick competition, as opposed to tax competition. The latter occurs when voters in any tax jurisdiction use the taxes (and expenditures) set by their own political representative relative to those in neighboring jurisdictions to evaluate the performance of their representative (Besley and Case (1995) , Besley and Smart (2001) Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2001) ). A standard method for testing for yardstick competition is to estimate a "popularity equation", relating the share of the vote obtained by the incumbent in the last election (or alternatively, a dummy recording whether the incumbent won the election) to the tax in that jurisdiction, and taxes in "neighboring" jurisdictions. We do not follow this approach here, for two reasons.
First, we believe that there is a prima facie case that yardstick competition in corporate tax rates is unlikely. The corporate tax system is complex and does not directly a¤ect voters (as opposed to say, income or indirect taxes), so it is simply not a salient issue for them when voting. Second, there is evidence that corporate taxes do a¤ect FDI ‡ows and location decisions of multinationals. Moreover, governments are aware of this evidence, and are clearly concerned about the mobility of the corporate tax base.
The layout of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis. Section 3 discusses several issues in the empirical implementation of these models. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 discusses further econometric issues, and Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 brie ‡y concludes.
A Theoretical Framework

A Model of Corporate Tax Competition
The objectives of our theoretical modeling are …rst, to understand the forces that generate competition between countries in statutory tax rates, EATRs, and EMTRs, and secondly, to generate some testable predictions. Our model builds on the well-known Zodrow-MieszkowskiWilson (ZMW) model (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986, Wilson, 1986) , and also extends the existing literature on this model in several novel directions.
Preliminaries
There are two countries i = 1; 2. Each country has a unit measure of capitalists, who each own an endowment of capital, , and a unit measure of entrepreneurs, each of whom owns a production technology (a …rm). A …rm can produce a private consumption good, using capital and entrepreneurial e¤ort. A …rm located in either country can produce output F (k; e), where k is a capital input, and e is entrepreneurial e¤ort 9 . We assume that e 2 f0; 1g; and that the cost of e¤ort to the entrepreneur is e: The production function has the usual properties (strictly increasing in both arguments, and strictly concave). The price of the capital input is denoted by r; and is determined as described below. Every agent resident in country i has utility over consumption of the private good (denoted by x) and of a public good (denoted by g) of the quasi-linear form :
where the function v is increasing and concave. One unit of the private consumption good can be transformed into one unit of the public good. Governments …nance the provision of a public good though a corporate tax, described in more detail below. Each government chooses the parameters of the corporate tax system to maximise the sum of utilities of the residents of the country, taking as given the tax system in the other country.
The mobility assumptions are the following. Capital is perfectly mobile between countries.
Entrepreneurs are assumed mobile between countries, but at a cost. An entrepreneur resident in country i can move to country j, but at a relocation cost 10 c. In each country, the distribution of these relocation costs is distributed on [c; c] with distribution function H.
9 The role of entrepreneurial e¤ort is explained in more detail in Section 2.3. 1 0 For simplicity, it is assumed that these costs cannot be deducted from taxable pro…t e.g. they are psychcic costs.
The order of events is as follows.
1. Governments in both countries choose their corporate tax systems.
2. Capitalists make investment decisions, and entrepreneurs make relocation decisions (if any).
3. Entrepreneurs purchase capital inputs and choose e¤ort.
Production and consumption take place.
We solve the model backwards, introducing additional formal notation as required. Of course, our main focus of interest is what happens at stage 1.
The above model is a variant of the ZMW model with two new features. First, …rms are allowed to be mobile. This is required to generate competition between countries in EATRs.
Second, we introduce a second input, entrepreneurial e¤ort. Without this feature, then in the case of immobile …rms, the government in either country could use corporation tax to tax the rents (the pro…ts from …rms) without causing any distortions. Consequently, the desired level of public good provision could be optimally …nanced …rst by taxing rents, and then, when rents are exhausted, by taxing capital 11 . So, without some upper bound on the statutory rate, a country would set a positive EMTR only when the statutory tax is at 100%. But when the statutory tax is at 100%, the EMTR is not in fact well-de…ned 12 . This problem could be eliminated in an ad hoc way simply by imposing an upper bound on : However, we present a relatively simple way of deriving an upper bound on endogenously, by allowing the rent of the …rm to depend on variable entrepreneurial e¤ort.
The Corporate Tax System
We begin by describing the corporate tax system and its e¤ect on the …rm. Consider a …rm producing output F (k; e). The tax paid by the …rm is (F (k; e) ark); where 0 1 is the statutory rate of tax, and a 0 is the rate of allowance. In the case of equity …nance, a is the percentage of investment deductible from pro…t. However, a can also re ‡ect the bene…ts of interest deductibility in the presence of debt-…nanced investment. Note that a cash ‡ow tax 1 1 The latter case would only arise when demand for public goods were high enough. 1 2 To see this, note that m = (1 a)=(1 ); so if = 1; m = 1; whatever a; using the notation of Section 2.1.2: This can be …nessed by imposing an upper bound of 1 " on ; where " is very small, but of course, the " is arbitrary.
would imply that a = 1 (all investment costs are deductible, but interest payments are not). To allow for debt …nance, we do not impose a 1. Post-tax pro…t is:
2)
The …rm chooses capital to maximise after-tax pro…t, which from (2.2) gives the following condition:
Hence m is the e¤ective marginal tax rate (EMTR) on new investment 13 . Consequently, m is the "dimension"of the tax system that determines the scale of a …rm's operation i.e. the choice of k, in any country, other things equal. Note that with a cash ‡ow tax, m = 0. Now note from (2.2) that the …rm's after-tax pro…t in a country with tax system ( ; a) can be written
Hence is the e¤ective average tax rate (EATR) i.e. tax paid as a percentage of true economic pro…t. Consequently, is the "dimension"of the tax system that determines the location of the …rm, other things equal. Note that with a cash- ‡ow tax, = :
To summarise, a corporate tax system with underlying tax parameters ( ; a) generates two di¤erent e¤ective tax rates, the EATR and the EMTR, which help determine the location decision of the …rms and the investment decision of the …rm respectively.
Classi…cation of Di¤erent Cases and Overview of Results
We can now consider di¤erent variants of the model, which generate competition in di¤erent "dimensions" of the tax system. Say that the two countries react only in statutory rates if the optimal choice of 1 depends on 2 ; and vice versa, and a 1 is independent of a 2 ; 2 ; and vice versa. Conversely, say that the two countries react only in allowances if the optimal choice of a 1 depends on a 2 ; and vice versa, and 1 is independent of a 2 ; 2 ; and vice versa. In each of these cases, tax reaction functions are said to be one-dimensional. The general case is where (a 1 ; 1 ) both depend on (a 2 ; 2 ) and vice versa, in which case tax reaction functions is said to be two-dimensional.
We can now identify the assumptions under which we get one-or two-dimensional tax reaction functions. First, note that …rms, or more precisely, the entrepreneurs that own them, may be mobile (c c < 1) or not (c = c = 1): Second, the price of the capital input may be determined in one of two possible ways. First, as in the original ZMW model, each of the two countries may be assumed "small" relative to the size of the capital market, in the sense that they cannot a¤ect r: In this case, we simply take r as …xed. Second, each country may be "large" relative to the capital market 14 , so that r is determined endogenously, and will be a¤ected by the taxes ( i ; a i ) set by the two countries i = 1; 2. The dependence of r on the taxes is sometimes known as the terms-of-trade e¤ ect.
We then have the following results: Model 2 is the mirror image of model 1. Here, there is no competition in statutory taxes, as they cannot a¤ect the price of capital. In fact, statutory taxes are set to extract the maximum rent from entrepreneurs, whilst inducing them to supply positive e¤ort. Given the statutory tax …xed, countries then set their allowances to manipulate the demand for capital, and thus the price of capital. So, countries compete in only allowances, or equivalently in EMTRs.
The most general case is where …rms are mobile and countries are "large". In this case, there will generally be competition both in and a i.e. the choice of 1 and a 1 will depend on 1 4 Following e.g. Brueckner(2000) , this is modelled by supposing that the entrepreneurs and capitalists of the two countries are the only agents transacting on the capital market.
1 5 This may sound paradoxical, given that the ZMW model is usually taken to be the canonical model of tax competition. However, from a formal point of view, it is true (and is shown in Section 2.3 below) that the tax choices of country 1 are independent of country 2, and vice versa, when r is …xed. What is called "competition" in the ZMW model is in reality, nothing more than the fact that with capital mobility, the supply of capital in any particular country becomes elastic, with the implication that the optimal tax on capital is lower than it is in the closed economy. both 2 and a 2 : We now formally demonstrate the claimed properties of Models 1 and 2, and also derive speci…c results on the shape of the reaction functions in each case.
Corporate Tax Competition when Firms are Mobile
Here, to avoid analysis of awkward corner solutions, we suppose that c= 0; so the distribution H of relocation costs is on support [0; c]: Then, if the tax systems of the two countries are not too di¤erent, there will be an entrepreneur of type 0 <ĉ < c in either country 1 or 2 that is indi¤erent about where he locates: we assume that this is the case in what follows 16 . Also, as discussed above, entrepreneurial e¤ort does not play a central role here, so we assume that the cost of supplying this e¤ort is zero i.e. = 0; in which case e = 1: So, then output is
We begin at Stage 3. From (2.3), an entrepreneur located in i = 1; 2 buys capital up to the point where
where m i is de…ned in (2.3) above: Solving this condition for k i ; we obtain the demand for capital by a …rm located in country i i.e. k i = k(z i r). Finally, the maximum pro…t of an entrepreneur, given a tax system ( ; z) is
Note by the envelope theorem, z = rk; r = zk:
Moving to stage 2, some entrepreneur initially resident (say) in country 1 with costĉ is indi¤erent between moving and not if
This uniquely de…nesĉ as a function of the tax parameters in each country. Note also that total di¤erentiation of (2.5) gives:
This is intuitive: as the statutory tax rate or EMTR increases, country 1 becomes a less attractive location.
Now consider the government's choice of tax at stage 1. The government can tax only the 1 H(ĉ) entrepreneurs resident in the country, and can tax both their rents and their use of capital. So, the government budget constraint for country 1 is of the form
The objective of government is to maximize the sum of utilities of agents resident in the country.
To calculate the latter, note that the consumption of the private good by each agent is equal to their after-tax income, which in the case of any capitalist is r , and in the case of the entrepreneur in country 1 is (1 1 ) (z 1 ; r). So, the objective of government is
Government 1 chooses taxes 1 , z 1 to maximize W 1 subject to (2.7), and equilibrium condition (2.5) determiningĉ; but taking 2 , z 2 …xed. Country 2 behaves in a similar way. Recall that the statutory rates are constrained to be between zero and one i.e. 0 i 1 and also that a i is non-negative, which implies that
We can now show that (given a technical assumption) governments will never use the tax on capital, as long as their pro…t tax is less than fully used i.e. i < 1: The required assumption is the following:
A1. W 1 is strictly quasi-concave in 1 ; z 1 ; treatingĉ as endogenous via (2.5), but taking 2 , z 2 as …xed.
This assumption rules out local maxima of W 1 that are not global for …xed ( 2 , z 2 ). It does not rule out multiple tax equilibria. Our result 17 is:
Proposition 1 (Optimality of cash- ‡ow taxes). Assume A1 holds. Then, if the government in country i chooses i < 1; it will choose z i = 1, whatever the tax policy of the other government.
The intuition is that a capital tax (a less than full allowance) causes a double distortion, in that it causes outward migration of …rms, and ine¢ cient use of capital by the remaining …rms, whereas a tax on rents distorts only location decisions. So, when the tax on rents is not being fully used ( i < 1); it is never desirable to use the double-distorting capital tax (hence z = 1 or m = 0).
Proposition 1 indicates that, in the terminology of Section 2.1.3, the two countries react only in statutory taxes whenever 1 ; 2 < 1: We can now study the reaction functions in statutory tax rates implicitly de…ned by the …rst-order conditions for 1 ; 2 under some additional assumptions.
Assume that the relocation cost is uniform on [0; 1] i.e. H(c) = c: Further assume that v is linear i.e. v(g) = g : this assumption may seem strong, but it encompasses a revenue-maximising, or Leviathan, government, as a limit special case (when ! 1):
1 7 Proofs of this result, and Proposition 3 are in Appendix A.
Then it can be shown (see Appendix B) that the reaction function 1 = R( 2 ); in implicit form ,satis…es the equation
At the symmetric Nash equilibrium in taxes, 1 = 2 = ,ĉ = 1. So, setting 1 = 2 = ,ĉ = 1 in (2.9), and solving, we obtain
This is the Nash equilibrium tax only if 0 1; which requires 1 2 3^ 1+^ 2 : Next, we can show 18 :
Proposition 2. Assume that the Nash equilibrium is interior i.e. 0 < < 1. Then, in the neighborhood of Nash equilibrium , the reaction function has slope between zero and 1 i.e.
0 < R 0 < 1 and is strictly concave i.e. R 00 ( ) < 0:
The intuition for this result is simplest in the special case of Leviathan governments. Suppose that country 1 is the high-tax country. Then, when country 2 cuts its statutory tax by 2 , from (2.6), this leads to an increase inĉ of approximately ĉ = (1; r) 2 ; recalling that z 1 = 1 by Proposition 1. Now, from (2.7), this increase inĉ implies a reduction in 1's tax revenue of
as (1 H(ĉ)) (1; r) is 1's tax base. As r is constant from country 1's point of view, it is clear that the loss of tax revenue is greater for country 1, the higher its initial tax. So, the higher 1 ; the stronger the incentive for country 1 to follow 2's cut and win back some of its tax base.
One further issue must be addressed before proceeding to the next variant of the model.
That is that Proposition 1 generally does not hold in the data reported below. Certainly for equity-…nanced investment 19 , z generally exceeds 1. There may be a number of reasons for this.
One possible reason concerns the treatment of losses. Giving full relief for all expenditure when it is incurred (or some equivalent alternative) implies that governments may end up subsidising loss-making investment. Typically, they are reluctant to do this. One response may be to choose a lower value of a and hence a higher value of z. In this case, the government will tax capital as well as economic rent, by imposing a positive EMTR. Conditional on this, governments can still compete for …rm location by choosing an appropriate statutory tax rate. However, for a < 1, the tax on economic rent is measured by the EATR, , rather than the statutory rate.
It is of course possible to impose an upper bound on a, and solve the model in terms of the EATR, . If we further made the assumption that the scale of the project, k were …xed, then^ would not depend on the EMTR. In that case, the de…nition of post-tax pro…t could be written as (1 )^ instead of (1 )^ as implied by (2.4) and Proposition 1. The critical value ofĉ in (??) would be replaced byĉ = (1 2 )^ (1 1 )^ :The de…nitions of the budget constraint and welfare would also have replaced by . The remaining analysis would then continue unchanged except that governments would compete over rather than . Of course, if the assumption of a …xed scale is relaxed, then (z; r) depends on z ,and the precise form of competition would di¤er.
In the empirical work below, we explore the two possibilities of competition over the statutory rate and the e¤ective average tax rate.
Corporate Tax Competition when Firms are Immobile
From Table 1 , our assumptions are now that (i) entrepreneurs are no longer mobile: (ii) the two countries are "large" relative to the capital market. Also, we assume for simplicity that
We begin at the third stage. using the de…nition of z i ; we see that the net pro…t of any entrepreneur located in country i who hires k units of capital is:
The optimal level of capital for this entrepreneur maximizes (2.11) and so solves f 0 (k i ) = q i = z i r: Inverting this gives the demand for capital, k i = k(q i ): Moreover, the optimal e¤ort of the entrepreneur maximises (2.11) and so satis…es
Also, de…ne the pro…t function 20
Note by the envelope theorem, from (2.13), q = (1 i )k:
At stage 2, r is determined via world equilibrium in the capital market. The equilibrium condition is that the sum of demands equals world supply, 2 :
(2.14)
Now consider the government's choice of tax at stage 1. The government budget constraint for country 1 is
The interpretation is as in the previous model: the government can tax both pure pro…t (after accounting for the tax on capital).which is the …rst term in (2.15), and also can tax capital.
As before, the objective of government in country 1 is to maximize the sum of utilities of agents resident in the country. So, the maximand of government in country 1 is:
The government of country 1 chooses (z 1 ; 1 ) to maximize W 1 subject to budget constraint (2.15) and equilibrium condition (2.14) determining r; but taking (z 2 ; 2 ) …xed. Country 2 behaves in a similar way. It is convenient to assume in fact that governments 1; 2 choose the cost of capital q 1 ; q 2 directly, rather than the tax variables.
Consider …rst country 1's choice of 1 : W 1 is not di¤erentiable in i ; as e¤ort is not di¤er-entiable in i : However, as long as the public good is desirable when taxes are lump-sum (i.e.
2v 0 (0) > 1) the possibilities for the government are clear: either tax at a level i = 1 ; which will induce the entrepreneurs to put in maximum e¤ort, or tax at i = 1; which discourages e¤ort. In a special case, as closed-form solution to this problem can be found:
Proposition 3. Assume that utility is linear in income i.e. v(g) = g:
For reasons discussed above, it is desirable to have countries choosing statutory tax rates of less than 100%, so we will assume that utility from the public good is linear and that condition (2.17) holds in what follows, so i = 1 . Note from Proposition 3 that the choice of 1 is independent of 2 and vice versa, establishing the claim that in this model, countries do not compete in statutory rates.
Now consider country 1's choice of q 1 : Assuming an interior solution for q 1 ; the …rst-order condition for q 1 implicitly de…nes a reaction function 21 z 1 = R(z 2 ) which describes how country 1's EMTR reacts to country 2's. To investigate further, we will assume from now on that the production function is quadratic (f (k) = k k 2
2 ): As utility is already assumed linear in the 2 1 Note that without terms of trade e¤ects i.e. with countries taking r as …xed, the …rst-order condition for public good, we refer to this as the linear-quadratic case. In can then be shown (Appendix B) that the reaction function takes the following implicit form: We now turn to the properties of the reaction function z 1 = R(z 2 ) implicitly de…ned by (2.18). In the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium, R has the following properties:
Proposition 4. Assume that the Nash equilibrium is interior and that 2 4 1 : In the linearquadratic case, in the neighborhood of Nash equilibrium , the reaction function has slope between zero and 1 i.e. 0 < R 0 < 1 and moreover, is strictly concave i.e. R 00 ( ) < 0:
Compared to Proposition 2, this requires an additional condition, on : However, this condition is not that strong. The bound on is at least 0:5, and can be compared to the condition for an interior solution, which is 0 : In fact, it is possible to show that 0 < 2 4 1 whenever > 1=3: As = 1 ; this implies that the bound on the capital stock always holds at an interior Nash equilibrium whenever < 0:7: The statutory corporate tax rates in our sample are all below this level.
q1 reduces to a modi…ed Samuelson rule for public good provision:
where "1 = q1k 0 =k1 is the elasticity of demand for capital, which depends only on r and z1. This is a standard formula (Zodrow and Mieszkowski(1986) ). Note also that given r …xed, this equation determines z1 independently of z2; which proves the claim of Section 2.1.3 above that there are no tax reaction functions in the ZMW model. 2 2 Combining (2.18) with the formula for r; and rearranging, we get:
Setting z1 = z2 = z in the above equation gives us:
(2 1) 2 z 4 (1 )(z 1) + 4 2 = 0 and solving this second equation for z gives (2.19).
Testable Implications of the Properties of the Reaction Functions
Propositions 2 and 4 state that, given some conditions, reaction functions are upward sloping and concave in the neighborhood of equilibrium. We would argue that these conditions are reasonable. First, the assumption of a quadratic production function in Proposition 4 can be regarded as a second-order approximation to a general concave production function. Second, the assumption of a uniform distribution of relocation costs in Proposition 2 is the borderline case between concave and convex distributions, and is thus a "neutral"assumption i.e. not biased in any direction. Finally, the assumption of utility linear in the public good (made for tractability)
tends to understate the concavity of the reaction function. Consider the case in Proposition 2, for example. Following a given tax reduction by country 2, the loss of public good is higher for country 1, the higher its initial tax, and this partly explains the concavity of the reaction function. Now, note that if v is strictly concave, country 1 has a second reason to do this: a reduction in public goods supply is more costly when g 1 is already low. But, in any case, our main argument is rather that reaction functions are unlikely to be linear, and so our empirical work should allow for some non-linearities.
Empirical Speci…cation of the Tax Reaction Functions
The theoretical analysis in Section 2 generated symmetric reaction functions of the form
where, in what follows, T i will denote the tax rate (whether statutory, EATR, or EMTR) in country i: The theoretical model assumed two symmetric countries. Allowing for n countries that may be di¤erent, and introducing time subscripts, the reaction functions can be written more generally as
where T i;s = (T 1s; T 2s; ::T i 1s; ; T i+1s; ::::T ns ) denotes the vector of tax rates of all other countries at time s, and X it is a vector of other control variables that may a¤ect the setting of the tax in country i. However, (3.1) cannot be estimated as it stands.
The …rst issue is that of degrees of freedom. In principle, each country could respond di¤erently to the tax rates in every other country. But then, even if (3.1) were linear in T i;t ;
and the coe¢ cients on the elements of T i;t were constant over time, then with 21 countries in our data set, this would imply estimating 21 x 20 = 420 di¤erent parameters, which is clearly not feasible. It is therefore necessary to make some assumptions about these parameters. In practice, we follow the existing literature by using a weighted average i.e. we replace the vector T i;t in (3.1) by:
That is, we suppose that every country responds in the same way to the weighted average tax rate of the other countries in the sample.
In our case, the appropriate choice of weights f! ij g is not obvious. In principle, we would like the weights to be large when tax competition between countries i and j is likely to be strong.
In the case of local property taxes, the obvious choice (and one that works well in practice, see e.g. Brueckner (2000)) is to use geographical weights, where ! ij is inversely related to the distance between jurisdictions i and j: A local government is likely to respond more readily to changes in the tax rates of neighboring governments than it would to rates in a di¤erent part of the country. However, in our case, the degree of tax competition between two countries may depend not only (or at all) on geographic proximity of countries, but also their relative size and the degree to which they are open to international investment ‡ows. We investigate each of these possibilities in our empirical work.
A second issue is that in practice, our tax rates are highly serially correlated, perhaps because abrupt changes in the tax system are likely to be costly to governments, either because such changes impose costs of adjustment on the private sector, or because such changes may be blocked at the political level by interest groups who stand to lose from the change. We include a lagged dependent variable in (3.1) to allow for this.
A third issue is one of timing. One problem with estimation of equations (3.1), viewed as a system, is that it imposes the restriction that taxes are continuously (i.e. in every period) at their Nash equilibrium values. This seems implausible: even within game theory, it is increasingly accepted that Nash equilibrium is best interpreted as the outcome of some adjustment process (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) . One very simple adjustment process that generates testable reaction functions is to suppose that the government in each country sets the tax as a myopic best response to the taxes in the previous period in other countries 23 . This would generate reaction functions as in (3.1), except that T i ; t is replaced by T i ; t 1 : We call this speci…cation of the reactions functions the lagged speci…cation, and (3.1) the contemporaneous speci…cation.
The disadvantage of the lagged speci…cation is that it is not directly consistent with the theory:
in particular, governments are assumed myopic in the sense that they do not anticipate any change in other countries'tax rates either due to changes in underlying economic conditions, or as a result of the other governments'myopic reactions to current taxes. As both speci…cations have their (dis)advantages, we estimate both. This is in contrast to the literature, where (as far as we are aware) all empirical work on tax competition estimates one or the other on a given data-set, with most studies working with the contemporaneous speci…cation 24 (Brueckner, 2000) .
So, the preceding discussion suggests two possible speci…cations, which can be written as
where s = t (resp. s = t 1) gives the contemporaneous (resp. lagged) speci…cation. These two approaches raise di¤erent econometric issues, which we discuss below.
The …nal issue is the choice of functional form of R i : We assume R i is linear in (T i;t 1 ,X it ):
However, as discussed above, we also wish to examine the possibility of a concave relationship between T i;t and A is . We allow for this by permitting the reaction of a country with a tax rate above the average (appropriately de…ned) to react more to tax changes of the other countries than do countries who have a tax rate below the average 25 . Speci…cally, we suppose that R i is piece-wise linear in A is , modifying (3.2) to
where
and where i is a country …xed e¤ect, and t is a period …xed e¤ect 26 .
D is is a dummy indicating whether country i's tax rate is above or below the weighted average in period s: This dummy appears on its own, and interacted with A is : Thus, we allow for two possibilities: simply being above the average may change the intercept of the reaction function; and being above the average may change the way T it responds to changes in the weighted average of the other taxes. It is clear from the discussion of Section 2.4 that concavity of the reaction function requires 2 < 0 and 3 > 0: So, our piece-wise linear speci…cation captures in a fairly crude way the concavity of reaction functions predicted by the theory.
2 4 There are, however, a few papers estimate the lagged speci…cation eg. Hayashi and Boadway (2000) . 2 5 We choose the (weighted) average of the other taxes as a switchpoint for the following reason. The theory developed above shows that the reaction function is concave in the neighborhood of the symmetric Nash tax equilibrium. It follows from this that country 1 will react more (less) to country 2 when 1's initial tax is above (below) 2's tax i.e. the switchpoint is when the two taxes are equal. The n-country generalisation of this, of course, is when country 1's tax is equal to the average of all the other countries'taxes.
2 6 Note also that we do not allow the coe¢ cients in (3:3) to vary by country, again to preserve degrees of freedom.
Data
The empirical approach in this paper is to estimate (3.3). To do this, we use data on the corporate tax regimes of 21 OECD countries over the period 1982 to 1999. As is clear from the previous section, there are several di¤erent possible measures of e¤ective tax rates which can be analysed.
In Section 4.1 we describe the measures which we use in this paper. We also include a number of control variables in the analysis; these are described in Section 4.2.
E¤ective Tax Rates
There are two broad approaches to the measurement of e¤ective tax rates on capital income.
One, proposed for example by Mendoza et al (1994) , is based on the ratio of tax payments to a measure of the operating surplus of the economy. This approach is not ideal for analyzing competition between jurisdictions over taxes on corporate income, for several reasons. First, at best it is a measure only of the e¤ective average tax rate, and so cannot be used to distinguish the two models described in the previous section. Second, it does not necessarily re ‡ect the impact of taxes on the incentive to invest in a particular location, because tax revenues depend on the history of past investment and pro…t and losses of a …rm, and also the aggregation of …rms in di¤erent tax positions. Third, this measure can vary considerably according to underlying economic conditions, even when tax regimes do not change; the variation is therefore due to factors outside the immediate control of the government.
The e¤ective tax rate measures used in this paper are therefore based on an analysis of the legislation underlying di¤erent tax regimes. Speci…cally, we use the measures proposed by . Following the standard approach, they consider the taxation of a hypothetical unit perturbation to the capital stock. The cost of the increased capital stock is o¤set by tax allowances, de…ned by the legislation. The additional revenue is taxed. Using this approach, it is possible to derive measures of the EMTR and the EATR, corresponding to those set out in Section 2. A brief summary of the approach is provided in Appendix B. In this paper, we consider four types of investment, corresponding to two assets -plant and machinery and industrial buildings -and two sources of …nance -equity and debt. Each of these investments has a corresponding EATR and EMTR.
In estimating reaction functions, we face a choice of which hypothetical investments to use.
We have experimented with three approaches. First, we considered each investment separately.
This revealed some di¤erences in results, primarily depending on whether the investment is …nanced by equity or debt. Our main …nding was that the results based on equity …nanced-investments were more in line with the theoretical predictions, but that the results were not sensitive to the choice of asset. For reasons of space, we report in Tables 3 and 4 only results based on an investment in buildings …nanced by equity. Second, we construct a weighted average across the four hypothetical investments. This is also shown below in Table 5 . Third, we have also experimented with stacking two of the investments, 27 thereby generating twice as many observations. However, this approach does not generate di¤erent qualitative results, and so, again for reasons of space, is not shown here. 28 We construct the EMTR and the EATR from the statutory tax rate and the allowance rules, between 1983 and 1999 for 21 high income OECD countries. Theses data were collected from a number of sources. Chennells and Gri¢ th (1997) provide information for 10 countries up to 1997. These data have been extended to other countries and later years using annual summaries from accounting …rms, notably Price Waterhouse tax guides (Price Waterhouse, 1983 to 1999).
We apply the same economic parameters (the interest rate, in ‡ation rate and depreciation rates)
to all countries in all years. 29 Thus the measures are not intended to provide the best possible estimate of the EMTR or the EATR in each year; rather they are intended to focus on di¤erences between countries and over time only in the tax regimes themselves.
The tax rates are brie ‡y summarised in 
Other variables
Clearly other factors may also in ‡uence a government's choice of corporation taxes. In the empirical formulation below, we therefore depart from the assumption of symmetric countries used for simplicity in the theoretical mode, by including a number of control variables in our regression. .
It has frequently been argued that corporation tax is a necessary "backstop" for income tax: that is, in the absence of corporation tax, individuals could potentially escape tax on their 2 7 To maximise variation in the data, we choose dissimilar investments, for example, investment in buildings …nanced by equity, and investment in machinery …nanced by debt 2 8 Further results are presented in the working paper version of this paper: see Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002) . 2 9 In ‡ation is set to 3.5% and the real interest rate to 10%. Economic deprecaition rates are taken from OECD (1991), and assumed to be 12.25% for machinery and 3.61% for industrial buildings.
earnings by incorporating themselves. One important control variable is therefore the highest domestic income tax rate, TOPINC it . These rates are collected from comparable sources to those for corporation tax: primarily annual guides from accounting …rms, and speci…cally those from Price Waterhouse. In addition, we introduce other control variables which describe economic and demographic characteristics which may plausibly a¤ect the setting of taxes, as listed below: We have also experimented with various political controls, such as election-year dummies.
However, these proved to be insigni…cant in the estimation and are therefore not reported.
Econometric Issues
From the discussion in Section 3, our system of equations to be estimated is
First, consider the contemporaneous version of (5.1), in which s = t: In this case, since the model predicts that all tax rates are jointly determined, it clearly indicates endogeneity of A it and hence D it . The empirical literature has typically dealt with this endogeneity by estimating the equation using maximum likelihood (see Brueckner, 2001 for a survey of empirical techniques).
However, this is complicated in our case by the need to allow for a non-linear response of T it to A it . We therefore follow a di¤erent approach, using instrumental variables. As a …rst stage, we …rst regress T it on (T it 1 ; X it ) -that is the control variables for country i. We estimate this as a panel, and derive predicted values of T it . Assuming the weights to be exogenous, we then generate the weighted average of the predicted values. We use this weighted average to generate
In the lagged case, in which s = t 1, we treat the weighted average of the lagged tax rates of other countries as being exogenous.
Unlike the maximum likelihood approach, the IV approach is robust to spatial correlation in the error term, " it . Nevertheless, we test for such spatial correlation using the Burridge (1980) test. We also test for …rst order auto-correlation in the error term, using a standard test (see Baltagi, 1996) . The test for autocorrelation is straightforward, since we test for correlation between " it and " it 1 . In investigating correlation across countries, however, there are 21 observations in each period: it is not clear what ordering they should have for the purpose of the test. Following Burridge, we combine the residuals from the other countries using the weighting matrix (for more details, see also Anselin et al, 1996) . Each of the test statistics is distributed as 2 with one degree of freedom.
In principle, we would want to include time e¤ects, to capture shocks in each period which are common to all countries. However, this is not always possible, since such e¤ects are already largely included in the weighted average and the lagged dependent variable. To see this, consider the lagged model, and note that we can write A i;t 1 (in the unweighted case, for example) as
The …rst term on the right-hand side of this is just n/(n-1) times the average tax rate across all countries, which varies only over time. So, if time dummies are also included in the regression, it is impossible to identify the e¤ect of this …rst term separately. So, the identi…cation of the coe¢ cient on A i;t 1 in the regressions would therefore be from the second right-hand side term.
But this is simply the negative of the (scaled) lagged dependent variable. The conclusion is that including time dummies, as well as a lagged dependent variable in the regression means that the coe¢ cient on A i;t 1 cannot be identi…ed. As this coe¢ cient is our main focus of interest, this is unacceptable, so we do not include year dummies in the lagged speci…cation: we use a country speci…c time trend instead. This problem is clearly less severe for the contemporaneous model i.e. the variables A i;t ; T i;t 1 and are no longer perfectly correlated, but there may still be considerable multicollinearity as T i;t ;.T i;t 1 are strongly correlated: again, in this speci…cation, we use a country speci…c time trend.
Empirical Results
We present the main results in four tables. Each table contains 8 In all cases, we present robust standard errors and the two LM tests for serial correlation and spatial correlation in the error terms. Tables 2 and 3 present results based on the …rst model of Section 2. In that model, reaction functions were based on the statutory tax rate or the EATR. In Table 2 , we present results using the statutory tax rate. In Table 3 , we present the alternative using the EATR as described in Section 4 and Appendix B. Table 4 presents estimates based on the second model in Section 2; this model generated reaction functions based on the EMTR. Finally, Table 5 presents the case for the contemporaneous model where the weighted average EATR and EMTR are used. In all cases, there are 357 observations (21 countries and 17 years). We include country …xed e¤ects, and a country speci…c time trend.
Consider …rst Table 2 . In all cases, the lagged dependent variable is highly signi…cant, with an estimated coe¢ cient of around 0.5. Of the control variables, two are highly signi…cant. One is the top income tax rate, which has a positive e¤ect, indicating that countries with higher income tax rates are likely to have higher corporation tax rates; this is consistent with the explanation given above, and is present in all the tables. The other is size: other things being equal, large countries have higher statutory tax rates; this is also true in Table 3 for the EATR, but only partially so for the EMTR. Again this is consistent with theory: the more impact a country's policies have on the world rate of return to capital, the higher it can set its corporate tax rate. Other control variables are signi…cant in only some of the speci…cations in Table 2 .
The LM tests indicate that there is neither serial correlation, nor spatial correlation, in any of the speci…cations in the Table. The e¤ects of the (unweighted) average of other tax rates is consistent with the model presented in Section 2.2. For example, in column I, the overall impact of the average is signi…cant and positive, suggesting that there is indeed a positively sloped reaction function in statutory tax rates. In addition, there is a large and signi…cant e¤ect in the case in which country i's tax rate exceeds the average. The dummy variable indicating this has a negative and signi…cant e¤ect, indicating that simply being above the average tends to reduce country i's tax rate. In addition, the average tax rate multiplied by the dummy has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect, indicating that, in addition, country i's response to movements in other countries'tax rates is greater if country i is above the average. These results support the prediction of concavity of the reaction function.
In column I, the long-run magnitude of these responses is as follows. If country i is below the unweighted average, then a one percentage point fall in the average will induce country i to reduce its rate by nearly 0.6 percentage points. But if country i is above the unweighted average, there are two additional e¤ects. First, simply being above the average would induce country i to reduces its tax rate by nearly 0.3 percentage points. Second, a one percentage point fall in the average will induce country i to reduce its rate by 0.75 percentage points. These magnitudes are large. Suppose country i has a tax rate above the average, and suppose that the average falls by one percentage point. Overall, we would expect country i to reduce its tax rates by around 1.63 percentage points. The magnitudes of these e¤ects are reasonably common to all the speci…cations, although the e¤ects of the overall weighted average is a little lower under the other forms of weighting, and is not always signi…cant. However, the e¤ects are strong and consistent in the case in which country i's tax rate exceeds the average.
The results of the lagged model, presented in columns 5 to 8, are rather di¤erent. There is evidence of some asymmetric adjustment to the mean in three of the cases considered (not with GDP weights). However, in only one case is there a signi…cant response to the weighted average.
On balance, this comparison between the two possibilities on timing is therefore in favour of the contemporaneous model. Table 3 presents results for the EATR for the single type of investment in buildings, …nanced by retained earnings. The results here are very similar to those for the statutory tax rate in Table 2 , although more consistent across the di¤erent speci…cations. Country size and the top income tax rate are again always positive and highly signi…cant. Of the other control variables, the proportion of elderly has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect in column I, and the proportion of young sometimes has a negative e¤ect. Again, there is no evidence of serial or spatial correlation.
The signi…cance and magnitude of the results on the average tax rates of other countries are slightly larger than in Table 1 . In column I, for example, if country i's tax rate exceeds the average and the average falls by one percentage point, then in the long run country i would reduce its tax rate by just over 2 percentage points. An even greater e¤ect is found under some of the other speci…cations. Once again, the lagged model does not generate a signi…cant e¤ect of the overall average, although there are strong asymmetric e¤ects. Table 4 presents the results for the second model of Section 2. That is, the tax rate used in these regressions is the EMTR, again for investment in buildings …nanced by retained earnings. Of the control variables, only the top income tax rate is consistently signi…cant across all speci…cations, although country size is also signi…cant in the contemporaneous model. This is perhaps not surprising; the EMTR measures the impact of corporation tax for a marginal investment. It does not necessarily re ‡ect the tax revenue which may be generated.
In the contemporaneous model, the impact of the weighted average of other countries'tax rates follows a similar pattern to the two previous cases. In this model, the average tax rate terms are generally signi…cant and have the expected sign. However, for the FDI-weighted model, there is only a signi…cant e¤ect for countries above the mean. The magnitudes of these coe¢ cients are higher than in the case of the EATR although this masks di¤erences in the means of the tax variables. Taking the unweighted column, for example, the long-run response of countries below the average to a one percentage change in the average would be to reduce their EMTR by 0.67 percentage points. In addition to this, countries above the average would reduce their EMTR in the long run by 0.86 percentage points, and would further respond to a one percentage point reduction in the average by cutting their EMTR by over 1.5 percentage points. The size of these e¤ects is rather large, and perhaps implausible.
By contrast, three of the lagged versions of the model imply that there is no reaction to other countries' EMTRs. The only signi…cant e¤ects are asymmetric e¤ects in the distanceweighted model. Overall, then, this Table suggests that evidence for competition in the EMTR is rather less robust than for competition in the statutory rate and the EATR.
Finally, in Table 5 , we present results for the case in which the e¤ective tax rates for the four di¤erent forms of hypothetical investment are combined into a weighted average. This table shows only the contemporaneous case; the …rst four columns are based on the EATR, and the last four columns are for the EMTR. These results are mixed. For the EATR, the only evidence of symmetric competition is in the distance weighted case. However, there is evidence of asymmetric competition using all four of the weights. There is rather more evidence of symmetric competition over the EMTR. This applies for using each of the three weights; and in each case there is little evidence of asymmetric competition. However, the reverse is true in the unweighted case, where there is evidence of evidence of asymmetric, but not symmetric competition. The di¤erence in these results compared with those in the previous two tables seems to be largely as a result of including debt …nance. The impact of interest deductibility can have counterintuitive e¤ects on the measures of e¤ective tax rates, especially on the EMTR. For an example, an increase in the statutory rate can reduce the EMTR, since a higher proportion of interest charges can be reclaimed against tax. This implies that it is hard to envisage governments attempting to compete over the EATR and EMTR for both debt and equity …nance, since changing the parameters of the tax regime can a¤ect these measures in di¤erent ways. The combined results of Tables 3 to 5 suggest that governments focus more on the more intuitive and straightforward case of equity …nance.
Conclusions
This paper presents an empirical analysis of competition in corporation taxes between 21 large industrialised countries, over the period 1982 to 1999. We consider two models of the competitive process, based on alternative assumptions about the mobility of capital and …rms. These two models generate di¤erent predictions about the form of the relevant tax rate. The …rst model indicates that it is the statutory tax rate, or e¤ective average tax rate (EATR), which a¤ects the location decision of …rms, and hence is competed over by governments. The second model
indicates that the location of capital depends on the rate of allowances, or the e¤ective marginal tax rate (EMTR). We test each of these models, by generating measures of each of these forms of tax rates, and then using them to estimate the determinants of countries'reaction functions.
Overall, the results suggest that governments compete over the EATR and the statutory tax rate. There is strong evidence also that this competition is asymmetric: that is, countries react more strongly to changes in other countries' tax rates when their own tax rate is above the average. This is consistent with the …rst model outlined in Section 2, in which …rm location choices are discrete.
By contrast, the results for the second -and more standard -model in Section 2 are more mixed. In this model, ‡ows of capital are determined by the EMTR, and this model too generates a prediction of asymmetric reactions. However, while there is some evidence that governments do react to the EMTRs of other countries, the nature of the response is less stable across the di¤erent speci…cations of the model. In some cases, there is no asymmetric response. In others, there is only a response if countries are above the mean. In general then, these results are supportive of the …rst model.
A. Proofs of Propositions 1 and 3
Proof of Proposition 1. Assuming interior solutions for i and z i ; the …rst-order conditions to this problem can be written as:
where 1 = (z 1 ; r) ; and the responses ofĉ to 1 ; z 1 are given in (2.6). Assume w.l.o.g. that 0 < i < 1, so (A.1) holds with equality (the corner case i = 0 is dealt with in a similar way).
Then, from (A.2), using (2.6):
Also, from (A.1), using (2.6):
Clearly, (A.4) implies that
So, by A1, the (globally) optimal choice of z 1 is 1, implying that the optimal choice of a 1 is also 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. Substituting (2.15) into (2.16) and setting i = 1 yields a payo¤ of
but substituting (2.15) into (2.16) and setting i = 1 in (??) yields a payo¤ of
Then, W 1 (z 1 ; 1 : r) W 1 (z 1 ; 1 : r) reduces to (2:17):
B. Derivation of Formulae For Reaction Functions B.1. Model 1
Note from (2.7), (2.8), H(c) = c; and the fact that z 1 = 1 that
(B.1) where^ = (1; r) is the pro…t before statutory tax when the capital tax is zero. So, substituting (B.1) in (A.1), we obtain the …rst-order condition which implicitly de…nes the reaction function
Noting thatĉ = ( 1 2 )^ from (2.5) gives equation (2.9).
B.2. Model 2
Note that for …xed at 1 ; the …rst-order condition for choice of q 1 is:
Moreover, given the quadratic production function, demand for capital in country i is k 1 = 1 z i r and consequently, from (2.14), the equilibrium interest rate is:
Next, to evaluate the terms of trade e¤ect @r=@q 1 in (B.3), recall that rz 1 = q 1 ; and also that @r=@z 1 = r=(z 1 + z 2 ) from (B.4). So,
and consequently,we have:
So, substituting (B.5) in (B.3), recalling that in the linear-quadratic case, v 0 = ; k 1 = 1 z 1 r; k 0 1 = 1; we obtain:
which gives (2.18) as required.
C. Description of E¤ective Tax Rates
We use the measures of e¤ective tax rates set out by . Consider a hypothetical one period investment. At the beginning of the period, the …rm increases its investment by purchasing an asset for unity. At the end of the period, it earns a return on this investment, denoted p + and reduces its investment in that period by 1-, where p is the (net) …nancial rate of return and is the economic rate of depreciation of the asset. The capital stock in all other periods is una¤ected. Given these cash ‡ows, it is possible to compute the tax liabilities and allowances which would be associated with such an investment. Comparing these ‡ows pre-and post-tax permits an analysis of the impact of tax on the incentive to undertake the investment.
Within this framework, two distinct models can be distinguished, corresponding to the two models in Section 2. The second, comparable to King and Fullerton (1984) , analyses the impact of taxation on the cost of capital -i.e. minimum pre-tax rate of return required to give a project zero net present value. Suppose in the absence of personal taxes that the discount rate of the marginal shareholder is r. Then, in the absences of taxes, the present value of the income generated at the end of the period is V = (1 + p) = (1 + r). Since the cost of the investment is C = 1, then the cost of capital isp = r:
Denote the present value of allowances associated with the additional investment expenditure as A. In present value terms, the …rm collects this at the beginning of the period so that the cost of the asset becomes C = 1 A. However, on reducing investment by 1 at the end of the period, the …rm loses tax relief of (1 ) A, making the net saving equal to (1 ) (1 A).
The return of p + is taxes at the corporation tax rate . In the presence of tax, then, the present value of the income becomes
Equating V and C, and solving for the cost of capital in the presence of tax, denotedp,
As shown above, the cost of capital and the EMTR -de…ned as (p r)p -are the relevant measures for investigating tax competition in the second model described above.
In the …rst model each multinational chooses where to locate a single plant. Fixed costs prohibit more than one plant. The multinational expects to earn a positive economic rent, at least pre-tax. In this case, we consider the pre-tax rate of return to be …xed -say at p -and compute the net present value , or economic rent, of the investment. The pre-tax NPV is
and the post-tax NPV is
Clearly, the di¤erence between these two values is the NPV of tax payments. The impact of tax on the location decision in this case depends on the relative size of these tax payments across jurisdictions. Scaling by the NPV of pre-tax gross income generates the measure of the e¤ective average tax rate (EATR) proposed by 30 :
Devereux and Gri¢ th demonstrate that this measures encompasses a complete range of e¤ective tax rates. That is, the EATR is a weighted average of the EMTR and the statutory tax rate, where the weights depend on p =e p, ie:
Hence, for a marginal investment, p = e p and hence EAT R = EM T R. At the other extreme,
It is straightforward to add other elements into this comparison. In particular, if the whole investment is …nanced by debt, the …rm borrows the post-tax cost of the investment. It repays this with interest in the following period, and receives tax relief for the interest paid. Details can be found in . Both forms of e¤ective tax rate therefore depend on the source of …nance. They also depend on the type of asset purchased, through the depreciation rate and the generosity of the allowance. We do not here incorporate personal taxes into the analysis. Neither do we allow for cross border investment, potentially taxed by both the home and host countries. A detailed comparison of these e¤ective tax rates for the majority of countries included in the sample used in this paper is shown in Devereux, Gri¢ th and Klemm (2002) . 5 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 year tax rates statutory rate EATR EMTR
